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Abstract 
New Criticism emerged in the early twentieth century from a field of 
literary theory dominated by Marxism and Impressionism; it rejected both 
of these from its start. In a bold statement of purpose, J.E. Spingarn 
sketched out the essence of New Criticism when he strongly emphasized 
the need for literary theory to return to literature as its basis and its 
particular context, rather than bringing in outside, non-literary interests. 
Despite some noted New Critics adhering to this principle less consistently 
than others, New Criticism itself gained adherents quickly and eventually 
grew to dominate literary theory. 
 
Ultimately, one of the most noteworthy things about the history of New 
Criticism is that its effective downfall did not come about from the creation 
of new theories at the opposite end of any spectrum, as New Criticism 
itself had, but mainly from a combination of theories that took particular 
aspects of New Criticism to extreme ends. When the New Critics 
embraced the idea that a work of art can (and, indeed, must) be analyzed 
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in itself, without reference to reality, they opened a doorway through 
which the upcoming Structuralists, Poststructuralists and 
Deconstructionists were all too eager to run--by rejecting the New Critical 
principle but keeping many of its implications and practices. Indeed, it is a 
testament to the lasting legacy of New Criticism that even after its 
preeminence has receded, its chief analytical method, the close reading, is 
standard practice everywhere, used on nearly any work for nearly any 
purpose.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, two forms of literary criticism 
were jointly dominant: Impressionism and Marxism. Impressionism places its 
primary emphasis on the subjective experiences of the reader (or critic) while 
reading a particular work; Marxism emphasizes the material conditions of a 
work's creation and the relation of a work's ideological content to the prevailing 
ideologies surrounding the work's creation. New Criticism rejected both of them 
(Spingarn 4). In rebelling against the prevalent critical doctrines of the time, 
New Criticism gathered a great amount of intellectual support and eventually 
became prevalent itself. Even after it became the standard, however, it 
remained a contentious theory. Ultimately, one of the most noteworthy things 
about the history of New Criticism is that its downfall did not come about from 
the creation of new theories at the opposite end of any spectrum, but by a 
combination of new theories which took some of the aspects of New Criticism 
to extreme ends and a resurgence of some of the theories New Criticism itself 
had replaced. New Criticism was and continues to be worthy of consideration 
for its theory and for its legacy. 
In 1910 J.E. Spingarn coined the phrase “New Criticism” as that which is 
left after the field of literary criticism is “cleared of its dead lumber and its 
weeds” (3, 14). In a short positive case for his position, Spingarn posits that the 
central question of criticism (of any art form) is “Has [the artist] or has he not 
created a work of art?” (13) Then, in perhaps the most important negative case 
for New Criticism, Spingarn declares what he considers to be the “dead lumber” 
blocking the way of new, more valid criticism, using this question as the 
guideline to determine the validity of the new criticism. 
The first things Spingarn identifies as antithetical to criticism are “the old 
Rules.” These are the dogmas first set by some late Greek thinkers and 
hardened into rules by the Romans. They include the proscription that no more 
than three actors may be on stage at any one time; that each drama must have 
precisely five acts; that genres must never be mixed. Spingarn condemns these 
rules as baseless and arbitrary, and argues that they do not at all aid in the 
creation of art: “in every age the poets have astounded the critics by 
transgressing rules without the sacrifice of beauty” (14). 
A corollary of the classical rules is the strict division of works along lines 
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of general resemblance into genres. In light of the questions of whether 
one has created a work of art, and if so what that work of art expresses and 
how, it is useless and inappropriate to inquire instead whether the work can be 
conveniently assigned the tag “comic” or “tragic” (Spingarn 15). If these 
classifications merely represent elements of a work's plot, they are to be used 
on the same general level as other plot elements, such as the expression of joy 
or a character's death, and do not influence critical judgment (Spingarn 16). If 
they are used instead to represent definite, abstract divisions of the concept of 
literature, they do a disservice to literature itself and go against the very nature 
of art: 
Poets do not really write epics, pastorals, 
lyrics, however much they may be deceived 
by these false abstractions; they express 
themselves, and the expression is their only 
form. There are not, therefore, only three, or 
ten, or a hundred literary kinds; there are as 
many kinds as there are individual poets. 
(Spingarn 15) 
Spingarn's rejection of “the history and criticism of poetic themes” follows 
roughly the same argument. When comparing two works it is sometimes 
relevant to emphasize common elements or themes between them, but the 
similarities end at that superficial level. Æschylus and Shelley both wrote 
pieces dealing with Prometheus, but their works were written in different ways, 
with different structures, different purposes, and different qualities of even that 
common element: 
It is possible to speak loosely of the handling 
of such a theme as Prometheus by Æschylus 
and Shelley, ... but strictly speaking, they are 
not employing the same theme at all. Each 
artist is expressing a certain material and 
labeling it with an historic name. For Shelley 
Prometheus is only a label; he is expressing 
his artistic conception of life, not the history 
of a Greek Titan. It is the vital flame he has 
breathed into his work that makes it what it 
is, and with this vital flame (and not with 
labels) the critic should concern himself in 
the works of poets. (Spingarn 21-22) 
Shelley used Prometheus neither in the same manner nor for the same 
purpose as Æschylus. This is not because they lived in vastly different 
societies, because they had had differing educations, or any other incidental 
difference between their lives; it is because they were creating two different 
works of art.  
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“We have done with... the assumption that style is separate from 
expression, that it is something which may be added or subtracted at will from 
the work of art, a flourish of the pen, an external embellishment....” A work of art 
must be appreciated and considered as a work of art, complete in itself 
(Spingarn 17). It may sometimes be useful to speak of the form that a specific 
statement takes within a text, with an implicit distinction with respect to the 
meaning of the work or statement, but such a distinction cannot be held outside 
of this very narrow context because it does not by nature occur outside of this 
context: when one begins to consider the text (the words on the page) in its 
entirety, as a unified work (the form of art), one must integrate the two to form a 
cohesive picture of what is happening within a literary work (Spingarn 17). In 
the same vein and for the same reason, a critic cannot simply identify a 
metaphor as such, for example, and consider his job done, because a 
metaphor is not simply a substitute for a more straightforward phrase: it is the 
most concise way of saying everything that it is saying (Spingarn 17-18): 
I think our initial question, “What does the 
poem communicate?” is badly asked. It is not 
that the poem communicates nothing. 
Precisely the contrary. The poem 
communicates so much and communicates it 
so richly and with such delicate qualifications 
that the thing communicated is mauled and 
distorted if we attempt to convey it by any 
vehicle less subtle than that of the poem 
itself. (Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought 
Urn, quoted in Green 69) 
Brooks' statement is not an indictment of all criticism, but an identification 
of the extraordinarily dense nature of poetry. The message of a poem is 
objective, meaning that it is contained within the poem itself, but a fundamental 
quality of the poetic form is that it is extremely complex. This idea of the poem 
as an unparaphrasable entity can even explain the overwhelming emphasis 
that New Critics placed on poetry: if the purpose of criticism is, as Spingarn 
said, to determine whether a specific document is a work of art, and the proper 
means to determine this is a close analysis of its structure (remembering that 
structure and meaning are inextricably tied together), then of course poetry, 
being the most complicated form of art, would bear the majority of New Critical 
interest. 
“We have done with the race, the time, the environment of a poet's work 
as an element in Criticism” (Spingarn 22). To investigate any of these things 
rather than what is contained in the text itself is to treat the text as a social 
statement, political treatise, historical document—anything other than a work of 
art. The result of such an investigation is a contribution to the study of politics or 
of history, but not to literary criticism. The job of the poet is not to catalog what 
external objects are brought into or influence a particular work, but to study the 
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elements that are in the work and discover how the artist transformed 
reality into art (Spingarn 22-23). 
Each of Spingarn's refutations intimately ties into the fundamental 
concept of New Criticism: the return to the text itself. A critic analyzing a work in 
relation to arbitrarily-set rules of literature only erects a wall between himself 
and the work's meaning; one analyzing a work in relation to predetermined 
genres does the same; to speak of common themes between works ultimately 
distances the critic from what the specific, individual work he is looking at is 
trying to say; the false dichotomy of structure versus meaning only dissolves 
the unity of a work and obfuscates its meaning; a focus on everything affecting 
the work except that which is contained within the work itself is equivalent to a 
person who speaks of analyzing a text while running away from it as quickly as 
he can—it is inherently dishonest to purport to analyze a work while actually 
analyzing historical circumstances, political ideas, or any other sort of . 
In making this statement Spingarn pitted himself and those of like mind 
against the entrenched theories in early-twentieth-century criticism. As part of 
New Criticism's rise to dominance in the field of academic criticism, it became 
prevalent in university English departments, particularly ones in the United 
States. This is due to two fortuitous factors of New Criticism. First, it was 
incredibly easy for a professor to teach to students: any student with an interest 
in literature, regardless of the presence or absence of a background in any 
other field of study, could become proficient in the New Critical method; 
likewise, no professor of literary studies was required to subtract from the study 
of literature in order to impart these backgrounds to his students (Clausen 55). 
Second, once a student learned how to analyze literature from the perspective 
of the New Critics and earned a doctorate, he could go on to earn a teaching 
position of his own and spread New Criticism as it had once been spread to 
him. In this way New Criticism's dominance (and, indeed, the field of literary 
criticism in general) came to be centered on university campuses (Clausen 56). 
In doing this, New Criticism fulfilled John Crowe Ransom's 1938 statement that 
“Rather than occasional criticism by amateurs, I should think the whole 
enterprise might be seriously taken in hand by professionals. ... I have the idea 
that what we need is Criticism, Inc., or Criticism, Ltd” (1109). This 
establishment in academic criticism created and solidified New Criticism's place 
in the field of criticism, while simultaneously shifting criticism's main forum from 
periodicals to more strictly academic areas (Clausen 56). 
Unfortunately, not all of those considered New Critics kept their critical 
practice to the theory of New Criticism. Most confusingly, one example of this is 
the one poet-critic who is perhaps best identified with New Criticism: T.S. Eliot. 
In his analysis of Shakespeare's Hamlet, Eliot establishes the concept of the 
“objective correlative,” a tool that seems to be of great use in judging the 
success or failure of a literary work. The objective correlative is that aspect of 
the work consisting of the plot elements that create the characters' emotions; if 
a work has completed its objective correlative, when the plot elements come 
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together, the characters' emotions are immediately and completely 
justified (Eliot, “Hamlet” 14). The objective correlative, in itself, can indeed be 
very useful in criticizing a work from a New Critical point of view: whether the 
work provides sufficient justification for the characters' emotions is a 
fundamental element of the work itself, and not a criterion arbitrarily brought in 
from outside of the work. The passage in Eliot's analysis that deals with the 
objective correlative—and Eliot's justification for stating that Hamlet is a failure 
because Hamlet's disgust and stymied state seems to be caused by his mother, 
while his mother as shown in the play is not sufficient cause for such a 
reaction—can and arguably does stand on its own (Eliot, “Hamlet” 14). The 
problem involved in fitting Eliot's essay into the paradigm of New Criticism 
comes only because there are several pages of analysis accompanying this 
passage, and this other material, while certainly interesting, simply does not fit 
with the “objective correlative” passage, nor with the theory of New Criticism. 
The most surprising element of Eliot's comments on Hamlet comes early 
in the essay: 
Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be 
interpreted; there is nothing to interpret; we 
can only criticize it according to standards, in 
comparison to other works of art; and for 
“interpretation” the chief task is the 
presentation of relevant historical facts which 
the reader is not assumed to know. (Eliot, 
“Hamlet” 12) 
One can imagine some comments that critics closer to the “ideal” of New 
Criticism—J.E. Spingarn, perhaps, or Cleanth Brooks—might have in response 
to Eliot's statements. “There is nothing to interpret”: there is the work, all of its 
constituent elements, and the manner in which the elements combine to form 
the whole. “We can only criticize it... in comparison to other works of art”: or we 
can criticize it according to what the work itself indicates as its message, and 
how well that message is conveyed (i.e., how far we have to dig to arrive at the 
message). “The chief task is the presentation of relevant historical information”: 
the chief task of the literary critic is to criticize literature on the grounds of what 
is present or lacking in the text itself. 
Another element of Eliot's criticism that seemingly distances him from 
New Criticism, despite his reputation as one of the luminaries of the theory, is 
his emphasis on literary tradition. “No poet, no artist of any art,” he writes, “has 
his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the 
appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him 
alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the 
dead” (“Tradition and the Individual Talent” 29). Eliot goes on to say that any 
poet must prepare himself to be judged against the great works of the past and 
that the extent to which a new work conforms to the old when they are 
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measured against each other is one test of the new work's value 
(“Tradition” 29-30). Clearly, this is taking the emphasis of criticism away from 
the discrete, individual work in question and placing it instead on a relational 
guideline of literary tradition. Later in the essay, in a seeming contradiction, 
Eliot says that “honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are directed not 
upon the poet but upon the poetry” and that “to divert interest from the poet to 
the poetry is a laudable aim,” but this only serves to compound the confusion: if 
one is diverting one's attention away from the poet only to compare the poet's 
work to that of other poets, is one truly getting away from anything? (“Tradition” 
31, 33) While it is perhaps true that viewing one work in terms set by another 
(or a group of others) can yield unique perspectives, the comparative method 
goes against the principles of New Criticism which demand that criticism be 
kept within the scope of the unique, singular work being criticized. To practice 
criticism as Eliot suggests would surely result in a different reading of a work 
than that of other critics, just as a Deconstructive or Psychoanalytic readings 
would result in differing perspectives. The method that Eliot suggests would not 
result in a New Critical perspective on a work—the result would be something 
else. 
One of the great successes of academic New Criticism was to keep 
explicit political agendas out of literary academia while it could. The effort to 
keep such agendas out of criticism was surely intentional—one of the theories 
against which New Criticism once rebelled was Marxism, whose theorists 
routinely used politics in analyzing literature, a method that a New Critic would 
deem beside the point of criticism. Many New Critics saw it as their purpose to 
rescue literary criticism from those who would hijack it in pursuit of ends other 
than the criticism of literature (Green 66). Many of the theories that rose in the 
wake of New Criticism in the latter half of the twentieth century took it upon 
themselves to fill that void: 
The New Criticism was followed by a number 
of complicated theoretical doctrines: 
structuralism, deconstruction, and, the latest, 
“cultural studies,” a still-evolving neo-Marxist 
method for “decoding” literary and other 
cultural artifacts. Cumulatively, their greatest 
effect on literary study has been to overthrow 
the central tenet of New Criticism—the 
autonomy of art—and in its place to 
institutionalize the social and political 
attitudes of the New Left, turning the practice 
of criticism into a weapon of assault against 
such extramural targets as American foreign 
policy, capitalism, imperialism, and 
patriarchy. (Clausen 56) 
The fundamental principle of New Criticism is that a work of art is 
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independent in itself, a unified entity. It is this principle which those 
theories that replaced New Criticism in mainstream criticism specifically 
rebelled against in the effort to use literary criticism for purposes other than the 
study of literature, whether political or historical (Clausen 56). 
New Criticism and many of the theories that succeeded it, particularly 
Deconstruction, share much more than either side would probably like to admit. 
They are linked by a common belief that the role of the critic is almost that of a 
translator, making clear to others what is presented in a “foreign” tongue—in 
this case, artistic expression. Christopher Clausen makes the argument that 
“the New Critics' embrace of the nonreferential text led them to place a foot 
experimentally on the top edge of a slippery slope, which... opened the way for 
more radical forms of subjectivism” (56). In short, when the New Critics 
embraced the idea that a work of art exists independent of reality, that it must 
be evaluated on its own terms and by its own level of communication, they 
stepped partway into a metaphorical doorway through which the upcoming 
Structuralists, Poststructuralists, and Deconstructionists were all too eager to 
run. The philosophical link between New Criticism and many of the theories that 
followed it cannot be accidental: in a natural development of New Critical ideas, 
the founders of the later theories took those same ideas in then-unexpected 
directions. New Criticism was the author of its own downfall—this, then, is 
ultimately its greatest weakness. 
If its self-defeating fate is the greatest weakness of New Criticism, the 
manner in which it defeated itself and its far-reaching effects are undoubtedly 
its greatest strengths. In a cruel twist of fate, every method of literary analysis 
practiced today, no matter how antithetical to the principles of New Criticism, 
owes some intellectual debt to it. In most cases, this debt is due to the near-
universal use of “close reading,” a method central to the intense concentration 
on individual works practiced by New Critics (Green 70). 
The field of literary criticism is wide enough and varied enough that 
anybody who wishes to use any method to look at any work will inevitably find a 
forum somewhere. The question then becomes not whether to criticize, but how 
something ought to be criticized—the manner in which a critic must approach a 
work. The theory of New Criticism—the ideal about which the more 
philosophical of the New Critics wrote—is to investigate the elements and 
meaning of a work from the inside, from the things that the author himself put 
into the text, where he put it, and how it related to the elements or pieces 
surrounding it. This theory has been criticized from many standpoints. “... New 
Critics denied that literary language makes true or false statements about 
reality, [and] deconstructionists (and other poststructuralists) deny that any 
language does so” (Clausen 56, emphasis in original). Marxists, New 
Historicists, Feminists, Black Theorists, and Queer Theorists criticize New 
Criticism for ignoring a text's relation to one external aspect of society or 
another. 
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While some claim that New Criticism ignores important aspects of literary 
works, a more common criticism is that New Critics are themselves hypocritical: 
their ostensibly apolitical method of analysis actually inserts political agendas 
into critical essays; for all of their theoretical essays on the return to the text 
and the metaphysical nature of the singular literary work as a unified entity unto 
itself, they delude themselves. The charge of political bias is a peculiar one: 
perhaps one could extract political messages from New Critical analyses 
(particularly analyses of explicitly political works, such as the colonial poetry of 
Rudyard Kipling), but when compared to criticism which openly seeks to 
connect literature to the greater workings of society, for example, the effort 
required to connect a New critical analysis with political ideas is enormous; one 
will not find in a scholarly essay by a New Critic an effort to condemn American 
foreign policy using the themes of a poem. The charge of theoretical 
entanglement in a theory that presents itself as outside of theory, however, is 
valid to a certain degree. New Criticism does indeed consist of a great deal of 
theory, as does any method of literary analysis—the identification of what 
precisely literature is in a metaphysical sense and the decision about what is 
the proper way to analyze and criticize literature are both esthetic processes, 
and therefore philosophical ones, and therefore theoretical ones. It is 
impossible to act without a theory or principle implicitly if not explicitly guiding 
the action. But the uniqueness of New Critical theory comes in the fact that its 
theory is trying to move away from theory itself, in a seeming contradiction. 
Ideally, for a New Critic, no abstract ideas would be needed in order to analyze 
a work other than those ideas contained within the work. Because the need for 
analysis—an abstract feeling, a concept—is required, this escape from theory 
is impossible.  
A specific context always dictates what action is most useful, most 
practical in that context. In the case of literary criticism, New Critics established 
that each literary work is its own independent context, with its own 
requirements, its own emphases, and its own properties; a work of literature is 
“a representational structure... inseparable from the representation itself,” a 
“complicated, unparaphrasable aesthetic structure” (Clausen 56). When New 
Criticism first took hold of mainstream literary criticism in rebellion against 
Impressionism and Marxism, this was a controversial and revolutionary 
concept. It is a measure of the success of New Criticism, though not at all in the 
way New Critics intended, that this is now taken for granted by most and 
considered inappropriately conservative by many. New Criticism has left a 
permanent mark on the history of literary criticism, and is worthy not only of 
serious study, but also deep respect. 
About the Author 
Glenn W. Butler is a senior at Southern Connecticut State University, and 
will complete a Bachelor of Arts program in English at the end of the spring 
2006 semester. 
Page 9 of 10New Criticism
8/31/2007http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol1n1/newcrit.xml
Acknowledgment 
The author would like to thank Professor Nicole Fluhr for her excellent 
instruction in the course for which this article was originally written. 
References 
Clausen, Christopher. “Reading Closely Again.” Commentary 103.2 (February 
1997): 54-57. 
Eliot, T.S. “Hamlet.” A Practical Reader in Contemporary Literary Theory. Eds. 
Peter Brooker and Peter Widdowson. New York: Prentice Hall, 1996. 11-15. 
---. “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Twentieth Century Criticism: The Major 
Statements. Eds. William J. Handy and Max Westbrook. Macmillan: New York, 
1974. 28-34. 
Green, Daniel. “Literature Itself: The New Criticism and Aesthetic Experience.” 
Philosophy and Literature 27 (2003): 62-79. 
Ransom, John Crowe. “Criticism, Inc.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism. Vincent B. Leitch, gen. ed. W.W. Norton: New York, 2001. 1108-
1118. 
Spingarn, J.E. “The New Criticism.” The New Criticism: An Anthology of 
Modern Æsthetics and Literary Criticism. Edwin Berry Burgum, ed. New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1930. 3-25. 
Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal 
ISSN 1718-8482  
Disclaimer: The work represented here is entirely the creation of the author. 
The L.U.R.J. does not in any way endorse the correctness of this article. 
Page 10 of 10New Criticism
8/31/2007http://www.lurj.org/article.php/vol1n1/newcrit.xml
